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I. Introduction and Background 
Consider this: an unmarked police vehicle is parked near 
the intersection of 177th Street and Broadway in the 
Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City.1 The 
police officers inside the vehicle are surveilling a large 
apartment complex. The officers are investigating an 
international drug trafficking organization, and they believe 
their suspect is in one of the apartments in the nearby area. 
The officers do not know which apartment building, let alone 
which apartment, belongs to their suspect. Rather than 
 
 1. This hypothetical is based on the facts underlying United States v. 
Lambis. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (detailing the process by which DEA agents used a cell-site simulator 
to locate Raymond Lambis’s apartment).  
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knocking on each of the apartment doors, and without first 
obtaining a search warrant, the officers deploy a cell-site 
simulator.2 The suspect’s phone transmits the cell phone’s 
serial number and the phone’s location within the apartment 
complex to the cell-site simulator. Having pinpointed their 
suspect’s location, the officers proceed to 701 West 177th 
Street, Apartment 55.3 The suspect’s father opens the door and 
gives the officers consent to enter the apartment. The officers 
arrest the suspect after seeing cocaine on the suspect’s bedside 
table.  
Now, consider this: police officers are investigating a 
string of sexual assaults in the Washington, D.C. metro area.4 
An unmarked police vehicle is parked just outside the 
Minnesota Avenue Metro Station. In search of their suspect, 
the officers inside the vehicle deploy a cell-site simulator, 
again, without first obtaining a warrant. The suspect’s phone 
connects with the cell-site simulator, and the cell-site 
simulator directs the officers to the suspect’s car, which is 
parked on the side of the street. The suspect and his girlfriend 
are sitting in the car. After obtaining the suspect’s consent, the 
officers search the suspect’s car and his person. Upon discovery 
of one of the victim’s cell phones, the officers arrest the 
suspect.  
The question raised by both of these scenarios is whether 
the officers violated the individual suspects’ Fourth 
Amendment rights when the officers deployed cell-site 
simulators to locate their suspects without first obtaining a 
search warrant. This Note seeks to answer this question by 
examining the constitutionality of law enforcement’s use of 
cell-site simulators, specifically addressing whether the use of 
a cell-site simulator constitutes a Fourth Amendment search 
or seizure. This issue is particularly relevant in light of the 
 
 2. See infra Parts I.B and I.C (explaining how cell-site simulators 
function and how law enforcement officers use them as surveillance tools).  
 3. Complaint at 2, United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 15-CR-00734), 2015 WL 13694512. 
 4. This hypothetical is based on the facts underlying Jones v. United 
States. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 708–09 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(describing police officers’ use of a cell-site simulator to locate Prince Jones).  
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Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States,5 in 
which the Court held that law enforcement officers must 
obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause prior to 
accessing historic cell-site location information (CSLI).6  
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled specifically 
on the issue of cell-site simulators, a number of lower courts 
have held that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.7 For example, the 
court in Maryland v. Andrews8 held that Baltimore Police 
Department officers’ warrantless use of a cell-site simulator to 
track a suspect to an acquaintance’s private residence violated 
the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights because “people have 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time 
cell phone location information.”9 Similarly, the court in Jones 
v. United States10 held that D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department officers’ “use of a cell-site simulator to locate Mr. 
Jones’s phone” in Jones’s car, which was parked on a public 
street, “invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy and was 
thus a search.”11 The court in United States v. Lambis12 
adopted a somewhat different approach in relying on the 
 
 5. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 6. See id. at 2221 (“Having found that the acquisition of Carpenter’s 
CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the Government must generally 
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such 
records.”).  
 7. See Jones, 168 A.3d at 713 (concluding “that the use of a cell-site 
simulator to locate Mr. Jones’s phone invaded a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and was thus a search”); Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 611 (concluding 
that “[t]he use of a cell-site simulator constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment 
search within the contemplation of Kyllo” and that “[a]bsent a search 
warrant, the Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking 
device”); Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 350 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016) 
(holding that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator requires a search 
warrant based on probable cause).  
 8. 134 A.3d 324 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016). 
 9. Id. at 327.  
 10. 168 A.3d 703 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017). In order to avoid confusion with 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), which is discussed later in this 
Note, Jones v. United States will hereinafter be referred to as “Jones (D.C.)”.  
 11. Jones (D.C.), 168 A.3d at 714.  
 12. 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States.13 The 
Lambis court held that DEA agents’ use of a cell-site simulator 
to track a suspect to his own apartment “was an unreasonable 
search because the ‘pings’ from Lambis’s cell phone to the 
nearest cell site were not readily available ‘to anyone who 
wanted to look’ without the use of a cell-site simulator.”14 
Although Lambis can be reconciled with Supreme Court 
jurisprudence,15 this Note argues that law enforcement’s 
warrantless use of cell-site simulators does not, as a general 
rule, amount to a Fourth Amendment search.  
This Note proposes four factors courts should consider 
when asked to determine whether law enforcement’s use of a 
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 
The first asks courts to consider whether the cell-site 
simulator surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected 
area, such as the home. The second asks courts to consider the 
duration of the cell-site simulator surveillance. The third asks 
courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance 
was conducted actively or passively. The fourth asks courts to 
focus on the nature and depth of the information obtained as a 
result of the cell-site simulator surveillance. If, after analyzing 
these four factors, a court concludes that law enforcement 
officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search, the court must 
then ask whether the search was reasonable.16 Cell-site 
simulators are generally used in the “enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.”17 Thus, if law enforcement’s use of a cell-site 
simulator amounts to a Fourth Amendment search, that 
search should be considered unreasonable, and therefore 
 
 13. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
 14. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610.  
 15. See infra Part III (critiquing the holdings in Andrews, Lambis, and 
Jones (D.C.)). 
 16. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (defining 
the reasonableness requirement as the ultimate touchstone and 
“fundamental command” of the Fourth Amendment).  
 17. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (explaining 
that a “neutral and detached magistrate,” rather than an officer engaged in 
the “enterprise of ferreting out crime,” should be the one to determine 
“[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search”).  
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violative of the Fourth Amendment, if it was conducted 
without a warrant.18 
The remainder of this Part provides background 
information regarding the development and use of cell-site 
simulators at the federal, state, and local levels. Part II lays 
out a general framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases. Part II.A concludes that law 
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator does not constitute a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, but Part II.B argues that it may 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Part II.B then delves 
into Fourth Amendment search case law, chronicling several 
key Supreme Court decisions that apply both the traditional, 
physical trespass test19 and the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test20 to various electronic surveillance techniques. 
Part II.B next analyzes the three cell-site simulator cases 
referenced earlier in this Part—Maryland v. Andrews, United 
States v. Lambis, and Jones v. United States—and concludes 
that the courts in Andrews and Jones (D.C.) came to 
overly-broad conclusions in holding that law enforcement’s use 
of cell-site simulators categorically violates individuals’ 
expectations of privacy. Part III proposes four factors courts 
should consider to determine whether, on a case-by-case basis, 
law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search. Part IV addresses the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and concludes that 
the warrant preference model for determining reasonableness 
is best-suited to cell-site simulators.  
 
 18. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the warrant preference model is 
best-suited to cases where law enforcement officers have used cell-site 
simulators). 
 19. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“[F]or most of 
our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular 
concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, 
and effects’) it enumerates.”).  
 20. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (proposing that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a 
person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy [that] society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).  
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A. The Development of Cell-Site Simulators 
Prior to 2015, a great deal of secrecy surrounded law 
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators.21 In 2015, the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland 
Security issued revised policies regarding the use of cell-site 
simulators,22 bringing their use out of the shadows and 
opening law enforcement’s practices up for critique.23 Both 
departments’ policies mandate that their respective federal 
law enforcement agents obtain search warrants prior to using 
cell-site simulators.24 Notably, however, neither department 
 
 21. See Kristi Winner, Note, From Historical Cell-Site Location 
Information to IMSI-Catchers: Why Triggerfish Devices Do Not Trigger 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 254–55 (2017) 
(positing that the nondisclosure agreements between Harris Corporation, the 
largest manufacturer of cell-site simulators, and law enforcement agencies 
are the primary reason for the shroud of secrecy surrounding cell-site 
simulators). 
 22. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces 
Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, at 1 (Sept. 3, 2015), https://
perma.cc/L4WF-Z2P9 (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (emphasizing the importance 
of cell-site simulator technology to law enforcement and explaining that, to 
enhance privacy protections, law enforcement must obtain a search warrant 
supported by probable cause before using a cell-site simulator) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Memorandum from Dep’t of 
Homeland Security on Dep’t Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator 
Technology, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/5RGA-BEXV (PDF) 
[hereinafter DHS Policy] (“[A]s a matter of policy, law enforcement 
Components must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause 
and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure . . . .”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (discussing searches and 
seizures).  
 23. See, e.g., Laura DeGeer, Note, Cell-Site Simulators: A Call for More 
Protective Federal Legislation, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 352 (2016) (arguing 
that Congress should draft a bill “enumerating when, how, and by whom a 
cell site simulator may be used”); Jenna Jonassen, Note, Stingrays, 
Triggerfish, and Hailstorms, Oh My! The Fourth Amendment Implications of 
the Increasing Government Use of Cell-Site Simulators, 33 TOURO L. REV. 
1123, 1127 (2017) (“[T]his Note attempts to provide an accurate road map of 
the various types of information concerning cell-site simulator use and how 
its implications on Fourth Amendment rights call for the establishment of a 
sufficient probable cause warrant prior to its use.”).  
 24. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY 
GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 3 (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/5YYW-D7DY (PDF) [hereinafter DOJ Policy] (explaining 
that, before using cell-site simulators, “law enforcement agencies must now 
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has conceded that law enforcement officers are constitutionally 
required to obtain a search warrant before using a cell-site 
simulator.25 Many state and local law enforcement agencies 
are not governed by similar policies or state laws and therefore 
are not required to obtain search warrants before using 
cell-site simulators.26 Thus, the constitutionality of law 
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators remains unclear in 
many jurisdictions. 
B. How Cell-Site Simulators Work 
Some familiarity with cell phone technology is necessary 
to understand the potential Fourth Amendment issues raised 
by cell-site simulators.27 A cell phone is essentially a “two-way 
radio with a low-power transmitter that operates in a network 
of cell sites.”28 A “cell” is an area of geographic coverage, often 
illustrated as a hexagon.29 A “cell site” is the physical location 
 
obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause and issued pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”); DHS Policy, supra note 
22, at 2 (explaining that, before using cell-site simulators, “law enforcement 
Components must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause 
and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”).  
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“The Department of Justice announced last September that in the future it 
would ordinarily seek a warrant, plus an order under the pen-register 
statute . . . before using a cell-site simulator, but it has not conceded that 
this is constitutionally required.”).  
 26. See Winner, supra note 21, at 261 nn.136–41 (listing Colorado, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Tennessee, and Wisconsin as 
the only states that have enacted statutes that regulate the use of cell-site 
simulators, and California, Minnesota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington as 
the only states that have enacted statutes explicitly requiring search 
warrants to use cell-site simulators); see also Stingray Tracking Devices: 
Who’s Got Them?, ACLU (last updated Nov. 2018), https://perma.cc/E8LG-
AU2J (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (mapping law enforcement’s use of cell-site 
simulators at the federal, state, and local levels) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 27. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with 
Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
(beginning the discussion of prospective cell-site data with an overview of 
basic cell phone technology).  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
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where the radio transceiver and base station controller are 
located.30 Cell sites send and receive traffic from cell phones in 
their geographic areas to switching offices, which handle the 
phone connections and controls for a given region.31 Most 
modern cell phones connect with cell sites several times per 
minute.32 Cell phones are constantly scanning their 
environments for the strongest signal, even when they are not 
in use.33 Generally, the strongest cell phone signal comes from 
the closest cell site.34  
When activated, a cell-site simulator mimics legitimate 
cell sites by sending out broadcasts to cell phones in its 
vicinity.35 Nearby cell phones then identify the cell-site 
simulator as the closest, most attractive cell site in the area, 
connecting with the cell-site simulator instead of a legitimate 
 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. See id. (“The cell phone re-scans every seven seconds or when the 
signal strength weakens, regardless of whether a call is placed.”); Carpenter 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (explaining that cell phones 
connect with their wireless networks even when the owner is not using one of 
the cell phone’s features).  
 33. See id. (“When a cell phone is powered up, it acts as a scanning 
radio, searching through a list of control channels for the strongest signal.”). 
 34. See id. (“Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking 
for the best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site.”).  
 35. See Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Cell-Site 
Simulators, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/EA8B-Z6C4 (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“The simulators send out broadcasts to phones in the 
neighborhood just as a real cell site would.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Cell Site Simulators, A National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Primer, BERKELEY TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC 
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/MV3F-3VQW (PDF) [hereinafter NACDL 
Primer] (providing an overview of how cell-site simulators work and 
outlining ways for defense lawyers to challenge the admissibility of evidence 
obtained via cell-site simulators); Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/92NJ-44XJ (last visited Feb. 
3, 2020) (describing cell-site simulators as “devices that masquerade as 
legitimate cell phone towers, tricking phones within a certain radius into 
connecting to the device rather than a tower”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); C. Justin Brown & Kasha M. Leese, StingRay Devices 
Usher in a New Fourth Amendment Battleground, CHAMPION, June 2015, at 
13 (reporting that a cell-site simulator is a device that can “locate the source 
of a cellular signal without going through the wireless carrier”). 
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cell site.36 Cell phones have no way of distinguishing between 
legitimate cell sites and cell-site simulators.37 
C. How Law Enforcement Use Cell-Site Simulators 
Once a cell-site simulator has connected with a cell phone, 
law enforcement officers can identify the direction and signal 
strength of that particular cell phone.38 By shifting the location 
of the cell-site simulator, an officer can determine the cell 
phone’s location more precisely than if she were to triangulate 
the cell phone’s signal using its CSLI.39 Due to their relatively 
small size, officers can either carry cell-site simulators by hand 
or deploy them in vehicles for larger-scale surveillance.40 
 
 36. See DOJ Policy, supra note 24, at 2 (“In response to the signals 
emitted by the simulator, cellular devices . . . identify the simulator as the 
most attractive cell tower in the area and thus transmit signals to the 
simulator that identify the device in the same way that they would with a 
networked tower.”).  
 37. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret 
StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over 
Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer 
Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (“As a result [of cell phones’ inability to 
authenticate cell sites], phones have no way to differentiate between a 
legitimate base station owned or operated by the target’s wireless carrier and 
a rogue device impersonating a carrier’s base station.”).  
 38. See Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 13–14 (summarizing the 
additional equipment needed to operate a cell-site simulator, which includes 
“an antenna, a device that processes the signals transmitted on cell phone 
frequencies, and a laptop computer that analyzes the signals and allows the 
agent to configure the incoming information”).  
 39. See id. at 14 (distinguishing cell-site simulators from cell tower 
tracking: “cell site simulators produce extremely precise location 
information, in some cases within an accuracy of approximately six feet”).  
 40. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 (describing cell-site 
simulators as “portable, briefcase-sized devices, which can fit in small cars, 
be carried by hand, and even be deployed on airplanes to facilitate 
larger-scale surveillance”); see also Kim Zetter, California Police Used 
Stingrays in Planes to Spy on Phones, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc
/MQ8K-GYHB (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (recounting the Anaheim Police 
Department’s use of Dirtboxes, or plane-mounted cell-site simulators, to 
conduct surveillance above Disneyland) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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Law enforcement officers can also use cell-site simulators 
to obtain a cell phone’s identifying information,41 including its 
international mobile subscriber number, mobile identification 
number, and electronic serial number.42 Once a cell-site 
simulator has connected with a cell phone, the cell-site 
simulator will obtain the signaling information relating only to 
that particular device.43  
Depending on the jurisdiction, law enforcement officers 
may have access to both passive and active cell-site 
simulators.44 Passive cell-site simulators intercept the signals 
sent between nearby cell phones and cell sites, but do not 
transmit any signals of their own.45 As a result, passive 
cell-site simulators “can only detect signals of nearby phones 
when those phones are actually transmitting data.”46 Active 
cell-site simulators, as the name suggests, directly interact 
 
 41. “Identifying information” includes the International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI), a unique number assigned to each handset, and 
the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), a unique number 
assigned to each SIM card. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1.  
 42. See Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 13 n.9 (“IMSI is the acronym 
for ‘[i]nternational mobile subscriber identity,’ which is a cellphone’s unique 
identifier.”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL 
PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW FORMS 40 (June 2005), https://perma.cc/2KEU-
6B5W (PDF) [hereinafter DOJ SURVEILLANCE MANUAL] (explaining that an 
MIN is a cell phone’s telephone number, while an ESN is the number 
assigned by the cell phone’s manufacturer to the cell phone); see also 
Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 (“Once your cellular 
device has connected to a cell-site simulator, the cell-site simulator can 
determine your location and read identifying data such as IMSI or ESN 
numbers directly from your mobile device.”).  
 43. See DHS Policy, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that “[c]ell-site 
simulators provide only the relative signal strength and general direction of 
the subject cellular device; they do not function as a OPS locator, as they do 
not obtain or download any location information from the device or its 
applications”).  
 44. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 37, at 9 (“The technologies that 
enable the direct interception of cellular phone calls without the assistance of 
a wireless carrier generally fall into two categories: passive and active.”).  
 45. Id.  
 46. See id. at 12 (noting that one advantage of passive cell-site 
simulators is that they are “far more covert in operation—indeed effectively 
invisible”).  
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with the cell phones they are used to surveil.47 An active 
cell-site simulator impersonates a cell-site by sending out 
broadcasts to phones in its vicinity.48 Thus, active cell-site 
simulators can connect with cell phones that are not in use.49  
Law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators is 
distinguishable from cell tower tracking, or the use of CSLI to 
triangulate a cell phone’s signal.50 However, law enforcement 
officers often use cell-site simulators in tandem with CSLI.51 
CSLI is the time-stamped record generated by a cell phone 
each time it connects with a cell site.52 Wireless carriers collect 
and store CSLI for their own business purposes,53 often for 
years at a time.54 Law enforcement officers use CSLI to 
determine a cell phone’s approximate location, either 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. See Kerr, supra note 35 (“The simulators send out broadcasts to 
phones in the neighborhood just as a real cell site would.”). 
 49. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 37, at 13 (noting that, unlike their 
passive counterparts, active cell-site simulators can “rapidly identify and 
locate all nearby phones that are turned on, even if they are not transmitting 
any data”).  
 50. See Stephanie Lacambra, Cell Phone Location Tracking or CSLI: A 
Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 1, 
https://perma.cc/WN9C-M7JP (PDF) (discussing ways in which criminal 
defense attorneys can challenge the admissibility of cell phone location data).  
 51. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (“Using CSLI, DEA agents were able to determine that the target cell 
phone was located in the general vicinity of ‘the Washington Heights area by 
177th and Broadway.’” (citation omitted)).  
 52. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018) 
(explaining that cell phones function by continuously connecting to a set of 
radio antennas, or cell sites, and that each time a cell phone connects to a 
cell site, it generates a time-stamped record); Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 
608–09 (describing CSLI as “a record of non-content-based location 
information from the service provider derived from ‘pings’ sent to cell sites by 
a target cell phone”). 
 53. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (listing the following business 
purposes for retaining CSLI: finding weak spots in networks, applying 
“roaming” charges, and selling aggregated location records to data brokers).  
 54. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter 
Chronicle: A Near Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 213 (2018) 
(discussing telecom companies’ move toward retaining CSLI for periods of a 
year or more as they realized the “potential for huge profits by monetizing 
such location data”).  
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historically55 or in real-time.56 The precision of the 
determination depends on the number of cell sites in the area 
and can range from “a few blocks to several square miles.”57  
D. Critiques of Law Enforcement’s Use of Cell-Site Simulators 
Privacy advocates such as the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) and the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) have argued that law enforcement’s use of cell-site 
simulators raises a number of privacy concerns.58 One such 
argument is that when law enforcement use a cell-site 
simulator to ascertain the location of a target cell phone, they 
invade the target cell phone user’s expectations of privacy in 
her physical location and thus violate the Fourth 
 
 55. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 n.6 (“Call detail records 
include the following information in relation to a phone call: time, duration, 
historical cell phone location information, completion status, source number, 
and destination number.”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (describing 
how, by using Carpenter’s CSLI, an FBI agent was able to produce a map 
retroactively placing Carpenter’s cell phone near the locations of four 
robberies).  
 56. See Lacambra, supra note 50, at 1 (noting that cell phone companies 
also store prospective data, which allows law enforcement officers to track a 
cell phone’s movements in real-time); NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 
(“Prospective location information, on the other hand, helps law enforcement 
trace the current whereabouts of a suspect, which can lead to arrest.”); 
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing law 
enforcement’s use of prospective CSLI to apprehend a suspect).  
 57. See NACDL Primer, supra note 35, at 1 n.2; see also Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2211–12 (2018) (observing that wireless carriers’ installation of 
more cell sites has led to increasingly compact coverage areas in urban 
areas).  
 58. See, e.g., Cell Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 
(maintaining that cell-site simulators disrupt cell phone communications); 
Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 15 (arguing that the “invasive action” law 
enforcement officers engage in when they use cell-site simulators “is akin to 
a police officer scrolling through a phone’s records”); Memorandum from the 
Am. Civil Liberties Union on Fed. Recommendations on the Use of Cell-Site 
Simulators, at 1, https://perma.cc/25M8-AYQG (PDF) (“Policies governing 
the use of these devices fail to comply with the Fourth Amendment, raise 
significant civil liberties and privacy concerns, and undermine effective 
judicial and Congressional oversight.”).  
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Amendment.59 Privacy advocates have also raised concerns 
regarding cell-site simulators’ ability to connect with large 
swaths of cell phone users at any given time,60 arguing that 
such use of cell-site simulators allows law enforcement to 
engage in dragnet surveillance.61 This Note only seeks to 
address the first method of surveillance—law enforcement’s 
use of cell-site simulators to track a target cell phone user.  
II. The Fourth Amendment Governs Law Enforcement’s Use of 
Cell-Site Simulators 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures”62 and “to secure 
the ‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”63 The terms 
 
 59. See How to Challenge the Use of Cell-Site Simulators, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/X98N-QR9D (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) 
(providing examples of arguments defense attorneys can use in challenging 
law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Letter from Nathan Freed Wilder, Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, to John Brooks, Chief of Police, Sunrise, Florida (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/P7SV-KBYY (PDF) [hereinafter ACLU Letter] (“And using a 
cell site simulator to ascertain the location of a specific cell phone can reveal 
that it is in a constitutionally protected place, such as a home, that has 
traditionally been immune from search unless law enforcement agents 
obtain a warrant based on probable cause.”).  
 60. See Zetter, supra note 40, at 2 (“Stingrays don’t just pick up the IDs 
of targeted devices, however. Every phone within range will contact the 
system, revealing their ID.”).  
 61. See Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 (arguing 
cell-site simulators facilitate “indiscriminate, dragnet searches” of “phones 
located in traditionally protected private spaces, such as homes and doctors’ 
offices”); Freiwald & Smith, supra note 54, at 229 (arguing that “this is also 
an easy case to predict” because the use of cell-site simulators “raises the 
specter of an illegal general warrant”); ACLU Letter, supra note 59 
(“Collecting unique identifiers of all phones in a particular location 
inherently collects location data on many innocent people.”).  
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 63. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) 
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also Camara v. 
Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (describing the basic purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment as “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government”); United States 
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (noting that one of the Framers’ central 
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“search” and “seizure” are terms of limitation.64 As such, “[l]aw 
enforcement practices are not required by the Fourth 
Amendment to be reasonable unless they are either ‘searches’ 
or ‘seizures.’”65 To qualify as a search or seizure, law 
enforcement practices must “bear the requisite relationship to 
‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”66 Accordingly, in 
examining the constitutionality of cell-site simulators, a 
threshold question that must be answered is whether law 
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator is a search or seizure 
that infringes on individuals’ rights to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects.67  
A. Law Enforcement’s Use of a Cell-Site Simulator Is Not a 
Fourth Amendment Seizure 
A “‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some 
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory 
interests in that property.”68 Case law regarding law 
enforcement’s use of electronic tracking devices is particularly 
 
aims in drafting the Fourth Amendment was “to place obstacles in the way of 
a too permeating police power”).  
 64. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1 (5th ed. 2019) (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)).  
 65. Id.  
 66. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974); see also Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a 
Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 540 (2005) (describing the need for 
“some sort of legitimate relationship between the property searched and the 
defendant . . . to generate Fourth Amendment rights” where law enforcement 
searches electronically stored evidence).  
 67. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment only limits governmental action and does not 
reach private searches or seizures).  
 68. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (explaining 
that the definition of seizure of property follows from the Supreme Court’s 
oft-repeated definition of the seizure of a person as “meaningful interference, 
however brief, with an individual’s freedom of movement” (citing Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981))); Mark Taticchi, Note, Redefining 
Possessory Interests: Perfect Copies of Information as Fourth Amendment 
Seizures, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 476, 477 (2010) (“Courts generally interpret 
possessory interest to mean physical possession, even when the property 
allegedly seized is intangible, like information.”).  
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helpful in determining whether law enforcement seize a cell 
phone user’s location information when a targeted cell phone 
connects to a cell-site simulator. In United States v. Karo,69 the 
Supreme Court addressed “whether installation of a beeper in 
a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner 
constitute[d] a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer 
having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper.”70 In Karo, 
DEA agents had obtained a court order authorizing the 
installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the cans of 
ether ordered by James Karo.71 After substituting a can 
containing a beeper for one of the cans in Karo’s shipment, the 
agents were able to track Karo to his residence, to a storage 
facility, and eventually, to an accomplice’s residence.72 The 
Court held that the actual placement of the beeper did not 
constitute a seizure73 because the beeper’s placement did not 
interfere with Karo’s possessory interest in the can of ether in 
a “meaningful way.”74 Under the Karo Court’s reasoning, 
therefore, a “technical” and “physical” trespass does not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure if the trespass does 
not interfere with an individual’s possessory interest in a 
meaningful way.75 
Law enforcement do not seize a target user’s cell phone in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment when they deploy a 
cell-site simulator. Although cell-site simulators may interfere 
 
 69. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
 70. Id. at 707.  
 71. Id. at 708.  
 72. Id.  
 73. See id. at 713 (“We conclude that no Fourth Amendment interest of 
Karo or of any other respondent was infringed by the installation of the 
beeper. Rather, any impairment of their privacy interests that may have 
occurred was occasioned by the monitoring of the beeper.”). 
 74. See id. at 712 (relying on the traditional definition of “seizure” as 
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in the 
seized property to support the holding that no Fourth Amendment seizure 
took place).  
 75. See id. at 713 (cautioning that “if the presence of a beeper in the can 
constituted a seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it would 
follow that the presence of any object, regardless of its nature, would violate 
the Fourth Amendment”).  
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“‘with the functioning’ of, or ‘coopt[ing]’ of [the] phone 
involved,”76 such interference is “akin to the interruptions or 
intrusions [that] . . . are permissible when police officers 
execute a search incident to arrest that turns up a cell 
phone.”77 The cell-site simulator does not, by “[h]old[ing] on to 
[a cell phone] for a minute,” meaningfully interfere with the 
cell phone user’s possessory interest.78 Thus, under Karo, law 
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator does not amount to a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. 
Writing in dissent in Karo, Justice Stevens argued that 
“the surreptitious use of a radio transmitter . . . on an 
individual’s personal property is both a seizure and a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”79 Justice 
Stevens relied on a property owner’s right to exclude80 in 
concluding that “[w]hen the Government attaches an electronic 
monitoring device to that property, it infringes that 
exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the 
property to its own use.”81 According to Justice Stevens, any 
interference with an individual’s possessory rights, which 
include the right to exclude, is a meaningful interference: 
“[T]he character of the property is profoundly different when 
infected with an electronic bug than when it is entirely germ 
free.”82  
 
     76.     This interference includes “having . . . calls dropped.” Jones v. 
United States, 168 A.3d 703, 743 n.39 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017).  
     77.    Id. (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386–89 (2014)). In the 
search incident to a lawful arrest context, police officers are “free to examine 
the physical aspects of [the] phone,” may “turn the phone off or remove its 
battery,” or may “leave a phone powered on and place it in an enclosure that 
isolates the phone from radio waves.” Id.  
 78. Id. at 743.  
 79. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 728 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing to 
express his belief that “the Fourth Amendment’s reach is somewhat broader 
than that which is explicitly acknowledged by the Court”).  
 80. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the 
legal right to exclude others from it.”); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 7 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1936) (“A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has . . . an 
intent so to exercise such control as to exclude other members of society in 
general from any present occupation of the land.”).  
 81. Karo, 468 U.S. at 728.  
 82. Id. at 729.  
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Arguably, under Justice Stevens’s rationale, the use of a 
cell-site simulator could be considered a seizure of the target 
user’s cell phone because the cell-site simulator interferes with 
the user’s most fundamental possessory rights.83 If a cell-site 
simulator effectively turns an individual’s cell phone into a 
tracking device,84 the cell phone owner’s property has been 
converted to the government’s use, thus violating the cell 
phone owner’s right to exclude.85 Despite the potential viability 
of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Karo, it was not adopted in any 
of the lower court decisions that have addressed the 
constitutionality of cell-site simulators.86  
B. Law Enforcement’s Use of a Cell-Site Simulator May Be a 
Fourth Amendment Search 
Like the term “seizure,” “search” is a term of art in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.87 Since the Supreme Court’s 
 
 83. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 
NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is “more than 
just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua 
non” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).  
 84. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (holding that, “[a]bsent a search warrant, the Government may not 
turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device”).  
 85. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 728 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“When the Government attaches an electronic monitoring device 
to that property, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense 
it has converted the property to its own use.”); Evers v. Cty. of Custer, 745 
F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A property owner’s right to exclude others 
is universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right.” 
(citation omitted)).  
 86. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 608 (examining whether Lambis’s 
motion to suppress evidence of “narcotics and drug paraphernalia recovered 
by law enforcement agents in connection with a search of his apartment” 
should be granted on the grounds that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site 
simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search); State v. Andrews, 134 
A.3d 324, 326 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (noting that the case presented “a 
Fourth Amendment issue of first impression in this State: whether a cell 
phone—a piece of technology so ubiquitous as to be on the person of 
practically every citizen—may be transformed into a real-time tracking 
device by the government without a warrant”).  
 87. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 420 (3d ed. 2017) (noting that while the Supreme Court has 
occasionally consulted the dictionary and similar sources for their definitions 
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decision in Katz v. United States,88 both “[e]xpectations of 
privacy and property interests govern the analysis of Fourth 
Amendment search . . . claims.”89 Although the Supreme Court 
has predominantly relied on the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test since deciding Katz in 1967,90 the physical 
trespass test has regained viability91 in the wake of the Court’s 
decision in United States v. Jones.92 Accordingly, whether law 
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators interferes with 
individuals’ rights to be secure in their “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects”93 must be analyzed under both the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test94 and the physical 
trespass test.95 
 
of “search,” it has not formally adopted those definitions); LAFAVE, supra 
note 64, § 2.1(a) 
The meaning of the word “searches,” the matter of primary 
concern in this Chapter, is not as easily captured within any 
verbal formulation. Under the traditional approach, the term 
“search” is said to imply some exploratory investigation, or an 
invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out. The quest may be 
secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it has been held 
that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or 
constructive, much or little. 
 88. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 89. United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993) (per curiam). 
 90. See, e.g., CLANCY, supra note 87, at 118 (noting that Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz has endured “as the predominant measure for the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections”).  
 91. See id. at 103–04 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s recognition 
that the Fourth Amendment protects property interests as well as possessory 
and liberty interests and that the property-based analysis has regained 
viability since Katz); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012) 
(concluding that the government’s placement of a GPS tracking device on 
Jones’s vehicle “supplie[d] a narrower basis for decision” that allowed the 
Court to decide the case under the physical trespass test).  
 92. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 94. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (proposing that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a 
person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy [that] society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).  
 95. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (explaining that the text of the 
Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property); Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (limiting an individual’s protected 
interest under the Fourth Amendment to “material things,” such that 
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1. The Physical Trespass Test 
Fourth Amendment protections were originally grounded 
in common law property concepts.96 As a product of the 
eighteenth century’s strong concern for protection of property 
rights against arbitrary and general government searches,97 
courts have often viewed the Fourth Amendment’s historical 
context as a primary source for understanding the Amendment 
itself.98 Under the physical trespass test, which asks whether 
the government “physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information,”99 the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections are effectively limited to the physical aspects of 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”100  
Decided in 2012, United States v. Jones signaled a revival 
of the physical trespass test and the end of the Katz-dominated 
era of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Relying on the physical 
trespass test, the Jones Court held that “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitute[d] a 
‘search.’”101 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied on 
 
conversations were not protected against unreasonable searches under the 
Fourth Amendment because they were not included in the list of tangible 
objects specified in the text of the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (concluding that “the underpinnings of 
Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as 
controlling”).  
 96. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 9 (describing the Supreme Court’s use 
of property concepts to limit the protections of the Amendment to “persons, 
places, houses, and effects,” thus dividing the world into areas that were 
constitutionally protected and those that were not).  
 97. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a ‘Search’ Within the Meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (pointing out that it was the 
Founders’ reaction to the English and colonial search and seizure abuses 
that culminated in the adoption of the Fourth Amendment).  
 98. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 104–05 (clarifying the justification for 
the Framers’ inclusion of the notion that “a man’s house is his castle” in the 
Fourth Amendment).  
 99. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 101. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.  
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the Fourth Amendment’s “close connection to property.”102 
Justice Scalia emphasized that an individual’s protected 
interests under the Fourth Amendment do not rise or fall with 
the Katz formulation because, in determining whether a search 
has taken place, “[a]t bottom, [the Court] must ‘assure[] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government 
intrusion that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.’”103 Accordingly, the Jones Court reaffirmed the 
proposition that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
test is an addition to, rather than replacement for, the common 
law trespassory test.104 
 In their separate dissents in Carpenter v. United States, 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch signaled a 
willingness to apply the physical trespass test to determine 
whether a review of historical CSLI constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search.105 The Justices’ underlying rationales for 
utilizing the physical trespass test were, however, based 
largely on the third-party doctrine106 and thus are inapplicable 
to the location information obtained via cell-site simulators. 
 
 102. See id. at 405 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close 
connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the 
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; 
the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been 
superfluous.”).  
 103. Id. at 406 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).  
 104. See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Co., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (explaining that 
the Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of 
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have 
nothing to do with privacy at all).  
 105. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223–24 (2018) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (advocating for “[a]dherence to this Court’s 
longstanding precedents and analytic framework,” specifically, to the 
“property-based concepts that have long grounded the analytic framework 
that pertains in [Fourth Amendment] cases”); id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his case should turn not on ‘whether’ a search 
occurred,” but on “whose property was searched”); id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (advocating in favor of a traditional property-based approach in 
which the Court need only ask whether “a house, paper or effect is yours 
under law”). 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) 
(concluding that Miller could not assert ownership or possession over 
subpoenaed bank records because they were the bank’s business records and 
not his “private papers”).  
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Unlike the location information obtained via cell-site 
simulators, CSLI is physical data that is stored by third-party 
wireless carriers.107 The third-party doctrine does not apply to 
the location information obtained by cell-site simulators 
because, in using a cell-site simulator, law enforcement officers 
“cut[] out the middleman and obtain[] the information directly 
from the targeted cell phone.”108 When there is no third party, 
the third-party doctrine is inapplicable.109 While it is true that 
“Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz 
formulation,” because cell-site simulators do not generate 
physical records stored by third-parties, their use should be 
analyzed under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.110  
2. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
Under the two-pronged Katz test, in order to assert an 
interest protected under the Fourth Amendment, a person 
must exhibit (1) an actual, subjective expectation of privacy 
that (2) society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.111 If 
 
 107. See Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance 
Still Doesn’t Require a Warrant, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc
/R9VT-D7HN (last visited Feb. 3, 2020)  
Right now, CSLI comes in three flavors. The first is “real-time,” 
where police work with a cell provider to access location data 
immediately after it’s created. This usually does require a 
warrant. The second is a “tower dump,” when authorities ask for 
all the phones that have communicated with a certain tower 
during a period of time. There’s not a lot of law about how tower 
dumps work, but as of September of last year cops rarely sought a 
warrant for them. The third is historical CSLI, where law 
enforcement requests a backlog of location data created by a 
certain phone. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 108. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).  
 109. See id. (“Without a third party, the third-party doctrine is 
inapplicable.”).  
 110. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012). 
 111. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (proposing that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a 
person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and “the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).  
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either prong is missing, then there is no protected interest, and 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.112 The Katz majority, 
in concluding that law enforcement violated Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy by placing a recording device outside the 
public phone booth from which Katz had placed his calls, 
explained that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not 
places.113 After Katz, therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis 
no longer exclusively “turn[s] upon the presence or absence of a 
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”114 
The first prong of the Katz test requires an individual to 
have exhibited “an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy.”115 The first prong looks at whether an individual, by 
her conduct, has shown that she “seeks to preserve [something] 
as private.”116 Justice Harlan clarified that analysis under 
Katz “must . . . transcend the search for subjective 
expectations,” because “[o]ur expectations, and the risks we 
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into 
 
 112. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 118 (contrasting Justice Harlan’s 
two-part test with the Katz’s majority opinion, which spoke in terms of 
unadorned privacy, without modification by any inquiry into subjectivity or 
reasonableness); see also, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 
(1983) (holding that the government’s use of a beeper to monitor defendant 
Petschen’s movements was not a Fourth Amendment search because a 
“person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another”).  
 113. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“[T]his effort to decide whether or not a 
given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects 
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”).  
 114. See id. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and 
seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn 
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”).  
 115. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 116. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). Professor Wayne LaFave provides a 
helpful example of a defendant whose expectation of privacy could not be 
considered reasonable: “a person openly engaged in criminal conduct in 
Times Square at high noon, who police observed engaging in criminal 
conduct.” LAFAVE, supra note 64, at § 2.1(c).  
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rules the customs and values of the past and present.”117 While 
the Supreme Court continues to use the “actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy” formulation, the Court has cautioned 
that in some situations it “provide[s] an inadequate index of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”118 Arguably, therefore, greater 
emphasis should be placed on the Katz test’s second prong, 
which requires an individual’s expectation of privacy be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.119 The 
following cases explore the Court’s applications of the Katz test 
to law enforcement’s use of various electronic surveillance 
techniques.  
3. Supreme Court Case Law Applying the Katz Test 
a. United States v. Knotts 
In United States v. Knotts,120 narcotics officers were 
investigating defendants Darryl Petschen and Tristan 
Armstrong for the manufacturing of illegal drugs.121 The 
officers discovered that Armstrong had been purchasing large 
quantities of chloroform, a solvent used to manufacture drugs, 
and delivering the chloroform to Petschen.122 With the 
 
 117. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).  
 118. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (noting that the 
individual’s expectation of privacy must also be justifiable when viewed 
objectively). 
 119. See Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 384  
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy . . . can neither add to, 
nor can its absence detract from, an individual’s claim to [F]ourth 
[A]mendment protection. If it could, the government could 
diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by 
announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all 
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic 
surveillance. 
 120. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
 121. See id. at 278 (describing the process by which the 3M Company, a 
chemical manufacturing company, notified local law enforcement that one of 
its former employees had been stealing chemicals used to manufacture 
illegal drugs).  
 122. See id. (“Visual surveillance of Armstrong revealed that after 
leaving the employ of 3M Company, he had been purchasing similar 
chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in Minneapolis.”).  
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chemical manufacturing company’s permission, the officers 
installed a beeper inside a container of chloroform, which the 
company later sold to Armstrong.123 Using the beeper, the 
officers tracked the container to Leroy Knotts’s cabin in rural 
Wisconsin, where they discovered a clandestine drug 
operation.124 Knotts and Petschen moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the officers’ warrantless 
installation and monitoring of the beeper.125 Their motion was 
denied by the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota.126 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence obtained 
from the search of Knotts’s cabin was admissible against 
Petschen, but not against Knotts.127 Knotts appealed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.128  
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether 
the officers’ “use of a beeper violated [Knotts’s] rights secured 
by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”129 The Court ultimately held that “[a] person 
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”130 In so holding, the Court emphasized that 
by driving along public thoroughfares, Petschen “voluntarily 
 
 123. See id. (describing the agreement under which the Hawkins 
Chemical Company agreed to sell Armstrong a gallon of chloroform with a 
beeper inside it).  
 124. After crossing into Wisconsin, Petschen began making evasive 
maneuvers and the pursuing agents were forced to end their visual 
surveillance. The officers lost the beeper’s signal for almost an hour. The 
officers were only able to regain the signal with help from a monitoring 
device located in a helicopter. Id. at 278.  
 125. Id.  
 126. See id. (denying the motion to suppress and convicting Knotts for 
conspiring to manufacture controlled substances).  
 127. See United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(explaining that Knotts, as the resident and owner of the property, had a 
reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy in the cans of chloroform, but 
that Petschen’s expectation of privacy was not one society would be prepared 
to recognize as reasonable).  
 128. United States v. Knotts, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).  
 129. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).  
 130. Id. at 281.  
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conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was 
travelling over particular roads in a particular 
direction . . . and the fact of his final destination when he 
exited from public roads onto private property.”131 The Court 
further explained that because the officers could have visually 
surveilled Petschen driving along public roads and onto 
Knotts’s property, “scientific enhancement of this sort raise[d] 
no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not 
also raise.”132  
The Court’s Knotts decision stands for three propositions, 
all of which are potentially relevant to an analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment issues raised by law enforcement’s use of 
cell-site simulators. First, the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit law enforcement officers from augmenting and 
enhancing their senses by using technology.133 Second, a 
landowner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the visual observations of an automobile arriving on his 
private premises after leaving a public highway.134 Third, a 
homeowner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the movements of objects outside his home in the “open 
fields.”135 
 
 131. Id. at 281–82.  
 132. Id. at 285.  
 133. See id. at 282 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the 
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this 
case.”); see also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (holding that 
the use of a “searchlight” is “comparable to the use of a marine glass or a 
field glass” and “is not prohibited by the Constitution”). 
 134. See id. (“[N]o such expectation of privacy extended to the visual 
observation of Petschen’s automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a 
public highway . . . .”).  
 135. See id. (“[N]o such expectation of privacy extended to 
the . . . movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the 
cabin in the ‘open fields.’”); see also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 
(1924) (“[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the 
people in their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the 
open fields.”).  
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b. United States v. Karo 
Building off of questions left unresolved by its decision in 
Knotts,136 in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the “monitoring of a beeper in a private 
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates 
the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable 
interest in the privacy of the residence.”137 After receiving a tip 
that James Karo had ordered fifty gallons of ether, a compound 
often used in the manufacture of illegal drugs, DEA agents 
placed a beeper in one of the cans eventually sold to Karo.138 
Using the beeper, DEA agents were able to track the can of 
ether as it was moved from Karo’s own residence to other 
private residences.139  
The Court applied the Katz test to the DEA agents’ 
monitoring of the beeper: “[P]rivate residences are places in 
which the individual normally expects privacy free of 
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that 
expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize 
as justifiable.”140 The Court went on to hold that the agents’ 
monitoring of the beeper was a Fourth Amendment search.141  
In so holding, the Court relied on the “general rule that a 
search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a 
 
 136. In Knotts, the record did not show that law enforcement had been 
monitoring the beeper while the can of chloroform was inside Knotts’s cabin. 
Thus, the Court “had no occasion to consider whether a constitutional 
violation would have occurred had the fact been otherwise.” United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).  
 137. Id.  
 138. See id. at 708 (explaining that ether is used to extract cocaine from 
clothing).  
 139. See id. (describing the can’s movements from Karo’s residence to 
Horton’s residence, from Horton’s residence to his father’s residence, and 
finally, from Horton’s father’s residence to a commercial storage facility).  
 140. Id. at 714. 
 141. See id.  
This case thus presents the question whether the monitoring of a 
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual 
surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who 
have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence. Contrary 
to the submission of the United States, we think that it does. 
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warrant.”142 The Court distinguished Karo from Knotts on the 
grounds that no constitutionally protected area was implicated 
by the law enforcement officers’ surveillance in Knotts, 
whereas the beeper surveillance in Karo allowed law 
enforcement to monitor the can of ether inside Karo’s 
residence.143 Unlike the surveillance information obtained in 
Knotts, the beeper monitoring in Karo “reveal[ed] a critical fact 
about the interior of the premises that the Government [was] 
extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have 
otherwise obtained without a warrant.”144  
Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo 
indicate that law enforcement’s warrantless use of an 
electronic beeper to monitor an individual’s movements is not a 
search if the monitoring reveals information that was 
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.”145 If, 
however, law enforcement’s warrantless monitoring infringes 
on a constitutionally protected area, such as the home, then 
law enforcement have engaged in a Fourth Amendment 
search.146  
c. Kyllo v. United States 
 In Kyllo v. United States, DEA agents directed a thermal 
imager147 at the side of Danny Kyllo’s residence in order to 
 
 142. Id. at 718.  
 143. See id. at 715 (emphasizing that by monitoring the beeper, the 
agents knew that the can was inside Karo’s residence, something they could 
not have verified visually).  
 144. Id.  
 145. See id. (“The information obtained in Knotts was ‘voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look’; here, as we have said, the 
monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could 
not have been visually verified.” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 281 (1983))).  
 146. See Freiwald & Smith, supra note 54, at 207 (“Knotts and Karo 
brought needed clarity . . . [a] dividing line was drawn between public and 
private space—tracking a vehicle on a public highway was not a search, but 
monitoring a device within the home or other constitutionally protected 
space was subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.”).  
 147. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001) (describing a 
thermal imager as a device that converts radiation into images based on 
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ascertain whether Kyllo was growing marijuana in his 
home.148 Scans from the thermal imager showed that the roof 
over Kyllo’s garage was “relatively hot compared to the rest of 
the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in 
the triplex.”149 The agents concluded that Kyllo was using 
halide lights to grow marijuana.150 Based in part on the 
thermal imager’s scans, the agents were able to obtain a 
warrant to search Kyllo’s home.151 The agents’ search revealed 
an indoor growing operation of more than one hundred 
marijuana plants.152 Kyllo moved to suppress all evidence 
obtained as a result of the agents’ search.153  
The issue for the Supreme Court’s consideration was 
whether the DEA agents’ use of a thermal imager directed at a 
private home from a public street constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search.154 The Court held that the information 
obtained via the thermal imager was the product of a search.155 
Specifically, the agents engaged in a search when they 
obtained “by sense-enhancing technology . . . information 
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area.”156  
 
relative degrees of warmth: “black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray 
connote relative differences”). 
 148. See id. at 29 (“Agent William Elliott of the United States 
Department of the Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown 
in the home belonging to . . . Danny Kyllo.”).  
 149. Id. at 30.  
 150. Id.  
 151. See id. (noting that the magistrate judge also relied on tips from 
informants and Kyllo’s utility bills in granting the requested search 
warrant).  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See id. at 33 (emphasizing that the case involved more than 
“naked-eye” surveillance of a home).  
 155. See id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is 
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”).  
 156. Id. at 34.  
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In so holding, the Kyllo Court expressed its concern 
regarding the effects advances in technology have had and 
would continue to have on individuals’ expectations of 
privacy.157 One of the questions the Court sought to answer 
was, given the circularity of the Katz test,158 “what limits there 
are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the realm of 
guaranteed privacy.”159 According to the Court, the answer, at 
least with regard to the interior of the home, lay in a “ready 
criterion”: protection of the interior of the home has “roots deep 
within the common law” and has been “acknowledged to be 
reasonable.”160 The Court concluded that because the thermal 
imager revealed information regarding the interior of Kyllo’s 
home that “could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical intrusion,”161 the use of the thermal imager 
constituted a search.162 
d. United States v. Jones 
In United States v. Jones, FBI agents were investigating 
Antoine Jones’s suspected involvement in a large-scale drug 
trafficking organization.163 In the thirty years between the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo and its decision 
in Jones, surveillance technology has made significant 
 
 157. See id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by 
the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (1979) (“And it is circular to 
say that there is no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy 
is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or will 
not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”). 
 159. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  
 162. See id. (acknowledging critiques of the Katz test but noting that 
withdrawing protection of the expectation of privacy an individual has in his 
home in this case would effectively “permit police technology to erode the 
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”).  
 163. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (“In 2004 
respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District 
of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made 
the target of an investigation . . . .”).  
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advances. Where the law enforcement officers in Knotts and 
Karo relied on electronic beepers to monitor their suspects, 
FBI agents were able to track Jones for twenty-eight straight 
days after they affixed a GPS tracking device to his vehicle.164 
Although the Jones Court was faced with an issue raised by 
more sophisticated surveillance technology, it relied on the 
traditional, physical trespass test in holding that the FBI 
agents’ placement and subsequent monitoring of the GPS 
tracking device on Jones’s vehicle constituted a search.165  
Justice Sotomayor, writing in concurrence, emphasized 
that although she agreed with the majority’s trespass 
analysis,166 surveillance cases like the one at issue should be 
analyzed under the Katz test because “physical intrusion is 
now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”167 In support 
of her assertion, Justice Sotomayor called attention to the 
issues raised by GPS monitoring, including the “precise, 
comprehensive record” it generates, the detail regarding an 
individual’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations” it reveals, and the ease with which it can 
be carried out.168 Justice Sotomayor urged that the GPS 
device’s capabilities be taken into account when “considering a 
reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s 
public movements.”169 According to Justice Sotomayor, in 
examining whether GPS monitoring constitutes a search, 
courts should consider “whether people reasonably expect that 
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner 
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, 
their political and religious beliefs, [and] sexual habits.”170 
 
 164. Id. at 403. 
 165. See id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS 
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).  
 166. See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“By contrast, the trespassory 
test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional 
minimum: When the Government physically invades personal property to 
gather information, a search occurs.”).  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 415–16.  
 169. Id. at 416. 
 170. Id.  
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Like Justice Sotomayor, Justice Alito argued in favor of a 
Katz analysis to determine whether the FBI agents had 
engaged in a search.171 Justice Alito placed particular 
emphasis on the “lengthy monitoring that occurred in this 
case,”172 noting that relatively short-term monitoring of a 
person’s movements in public does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.173 Justice Alito was most concerned with the ease 
and detail with which the FBI agents were able to track Jones: 
“[F]or four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every 
movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was 
driving.”174 Although he was unwilling to “identify with 
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became 
a search,” Justice Alito concluded that the “line was surely 
crossed before the 4-week mark.”175 Justice Alito proposed 
that, in future cases, courts ask “whether the use of GPS 
tracking in a particular case involve[s] a degree of intrusion 
that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”176 
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined in 
Justice Alito’s concurrence. Thus, according to five Justices, 
because GPS monitoring tracks “every movement” an 
individual makes, “longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.”177  
e. Carpenter v. United States 
In Carpenter v. United States, FBI agents obtained 127 
days’ worth of defendant Timothy Carpenter’s CSLI during 
 
 171. See id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing the Court should have 
“analyze[d] the question presented in this case by asking whether 
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated”).  
 172. Id. at 431.  
 173. Id. at 430.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see 
also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) (citing to the 
two concurrences in Jones to support the proposition that longer term GPS 
monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy”—regardless of whether 
those movements were disclosed to the public at large).  
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their investigation into a string of robberies.178 After the 
prosecution identified Carpenter as one of the accomplices who 
had participated in the heists,179 a magistrate judge ordered 
MetroPCS and Sprint to “disclose ‘cell/site sector [information] 
for [Carpenter’s] telephone[] at call origination and at call 
termination for incoming and outgoing calls’ during the 
four-month period when the string of robberies occurred.”180 
Using Carpenter’s CSLI, the prosecution was able to 
retroactively place Carpenter’s cell phone near the location of 
the robberies at the date and time each robbery took place.181 
At trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI.182 The District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Carpenter’s 
motion,183 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.184 Carpenter then 
appealed to the Supreme Court.185  
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding 
that the location information obtained from Carpenter’s 
wireless carriers was the product of a search, and that law 
enforcement must generally obtain a warrant supported by 
probable cause before obtaining CSLI.186 The Court applied the 
 
 178. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) 
(describing as “ironic” the string of robberies of Radio Shack and T-Mobile 
stores in Michigan and Ohio).  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. (citation omitted).  
 181. See id. at 2213 (explaining the FBI agent’s process of using 
Carpenter’s CSLI to generate maps placing Carpenter’s cell phone near four 
of the charged robberies).  
 182. See id. at 2212 (arguing that the government’s seizure of 
Carpenter’s CSLI records violated his Fourth Amendment rights because 
they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause).  
 183. See United States v. Carpenter, No. 12–20218, 2013 WL 6385838, at 
*6 (E.D. Mich., Dec. 6, 2013) (denying Carpenter’s motion to suppress his 
CSLI and his motion seeking to preclude the expert testimony of the FBI 
special agent who generated the maps placing Carpenter’s cell phone near 
the sites of the robberies).  
 184. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 185. See Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (granting 
certiorari).  
 186. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“Having found that the 
acquisition of Carpenter’s CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the 
Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause 
before acquiring such records.”).  
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Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, noting that CSLI 
implicates an individual’s expectation of privacy in both his 
“physical location and movements” and “in information 
voluntarily turned over to third parties.”187 The Court held 
that Carpenter “maintain[ed] a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured 
through CSLI,”188 and that law enforcement’s access of seven 
days’ worth of Carpenter’s CSLI constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search.189  
In so holding, the Court compared law enforcement’s use 
of CSLI to GPS monitoring, noting that the “detailed, 
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” data used to track a 
person via their CSLI was qualitatively similar to the GPS 
monitoring in Jones.190 Like GPS monitoring, access to CSLI is 
“remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional 
investigative tools.”191 Arguably, however, law enforcement’s 
use of CSLI raises even greater privacy concerns than the GPS 
monitoring in Jones because cell phones are almost “feature[s] 
of human anatomy” that track the movements of their users 
 
 187. See id. at 2214–15 (“[R]equests for cell-site records lie at the 
intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of 
the privacy interests at stake.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743 (1979) (holding that an individual does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the records of his dialed telephone numbers held by 
the individual’s telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
444–45 (1976) (holding that an individual does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily disclosed to a bank). 
Compare United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (concluding that privacy concerns would be raised by GPS 
tracking), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding 
that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another”).  
 188. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (explaining that the seven days’ 
worth of CSLI from Sprint was the “pertinent period”). 
 189. See id. at 2217 n.3 (responding to the alternative argument that 
“the acquisition of CSLI becomes a search only if it extends beyond a limited 
period”). 
 190. See id. at 2216 (analogizing law enforcement’s use of CSLI in this 
case to the GPS tracking of a vehicle; in both instances, the location 
information is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”). 
 191. Id. at 2218.  
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“nearly exactly.”192 Additionally, the retrospective nature of 
CSLI grants law enforcement access to historical location 
information, “a category of information [that is] otherwise 
unknowable.”193  
4. Case Law Applying the Katz Test to Law Enforcement’s Use 
of Cell-Site Simulators 
a. Maryland v. Andrews 
In Maryland v. Andrews, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland considered whether “the use of a cellular tracking 
device to locate Andrews’s phone violated the Fourth 
Amendment.”194 Baltimore police had used a cell-site simulator 
to locate Andrews at an acquaintance’s apartment.195 The court 
concluded that “individuals have a reasonable expectation that 
their cell phones will not be used as real-time tracking devices 
by law enforcement, and—recognizing that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not simply areas—that people 
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
real-time cell phone location information.”196 According to the 
Andrews court, therefore, “the use of a cell-site simulator . . . by 
the government, requires a search warrant based on probable 
cause and describing with particularity the object and manner 
of the search, unless an established exception to the warrant 
requirement applies.”197 
In holding that Andrews had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the location information obtained by the cell-site 
 
 192. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (“[T]he proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude [cell phones] were an important feature of 
human anatomy.”).  
 193. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).  
 194. Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 326 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016).  
 195. The Government also argued that Andrews lacked standing to 
challenge the search because Andrews did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in an acquaintance’s residence. The Andrews court refused to rule 
on the standing argument because it had “already determined that Andrews 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregate and real-time 
location information (CSLI) contained in his cell phone.” Id. at 352–53.  
 196. Id. at 327.  
 197. Id. at 395.  
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simulator, the Andrews court rejected two propositions.198 
First, the court rejected the idea that cell phone users 
voluntarily convey their location information simply by 
choosing to use their cell phones and to carry the devices on 
their person.199 Second, the court dismissed the proposition 
that cell phone users should expect that their information is 
being sent directly to the police department.200  
b. United States v. Lambis 
In United States v. Lambis, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York also held that law 
enforcement must obtain a search warrant supported by 
probable cause before using a cell-site simulator.201 DEA 
agents obtained Lambis’s cell phone number as part of their 
investigation into an international drug trafficking 
organization.202 The agents initially used CSLI to determine 
the approximate location of Lambis’s cell phone, but the CSLI 
was not precise enough to identify Lambis’s apartment 
building.203 Using a cell-site simulator, a trained DEA 
technician located Lambis’s apartment building and specific 
apartment by isolating the signal emanating from Lambis’s 
 
 198. Id. at 392–93. 
 199. See id. at 392 (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Graham that courts “cannot accept the proposition that cell phone 
users volunteer to convey their location information simply by choosing to 
activate and use their cell phones and to carry the devices on their person” 
(quoting United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2700 (2018))).  
 200. See id. at 392–93 (accepting the circuit court’s finding that “no one 
expects that their phone information is being sent directly to the police 
department on their apparatus”).  
 201. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 609, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (explaining that, in light of Kyllo, DEA agents’ use of a cell-site 
simulator to locate Lambis’s apartment was an “unreasonable search 
because the ‘pings’ from Lambis’s cell phone to the nearest cell site were not 
readily available ‘to anyone who wanted to look’ without the use of a cell-site 
simulator”). 
 202. Id. at 609.  
 203. See id. (describing the CSLI as not precise enough to identify 
Lambis’s specific apartment building, much less the specific unit in the 
apartment complexes in the area).  
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cell phone.204 Later that same day, Lambis’s father gave the 
agents consent to enter the apartment,205 where they recovered 
narcotics and other drug paraphernalia from Lambis’s 
bedroom.206 Lambis filed a motion to suppress the evidence of 
drugs and drug paraphernalia.207 
The court held that the DEA agents’ warrantless use of a 
cell-site simulator constituted an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.208 Relying heavily on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo,209 the Lambis court 
reasoned that the agents’ use of the cell-site simulator was a 
search because the “‘pings’ from Lambis’s cell phone . . . were 
not readily available ‘to anyone who wanted to look.’”210  
c. Jones v. United States 
In Jones v. United States, officers from the D.C. 
Metropolitan Police Department used a cell-site simulator to 
track a suspect wanted for two sexual assaults.211 The officers 
 
 204. See id. (“Activating the cell-site simulator, the DEA technician first 
identified the apartment building with the strongest ping. Then, the 
technician entered that apartment building and walked the halls until he 
located the specific apartment where the signal was strongest.”).  
 205. See id. (noting that Lambis himself also gave his consent when DEA 
agents asked to search his bedroom).  
 206. See id. (detailing the DEA agents’ seizure of narcotics, three digital 
scales, empty zip lock bags, and other drug paraphernalia from Lambis’s 
bedroom).  
 207. Id.  
 208. See id. at 611 (discussing the special significance afforded to the 
home under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 
(2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.’” (citation omitted)). 
 209. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that when “the Government uses 
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant”).  
 210. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).  
 211. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(recounting that the officers’ review of the two victims’ phone records 
revealed they both had received phone calls from Jones).  
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believed their suspect, Jones, had stolen one of the victim’s cell 
phones.212 To further their investigation, the officers sought 
and obtained real-time CSLI from both Jones’s and the victim’s 
telecommunications providers.213 This information placed the 
two cell phones in the general vicinity of the Minnesota 
Avenue Metro Station.214 In order to better pinpoint the 
locations of the two cell phones, the officers drove a truck 
equipped with a cell-site simulator around the station.215 Using 
the cell-site simulator, the officers tracked Jones’s cell phone’s 
signal to a parked vehicle.216 “Inside the [vehicle] were Mr. 
Jones and Mr. Jones’s girlfriend, Nora Williams.”217  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the officers’ 
use of the cell-site simulator to locate Jones’s phone “invaded 
[his] reasonable expectation of privacy and was thus a 
search.”218 The court began its analysis with an “obvious fact”: 
“[M]ost people have a cellphone and carry it with them 
practically everywhere they go.”219 According to the court, 
because cell phone usage is so pervasive, cell-site simulators 
have “substantial potential to expose the [cell phone] owner’s 
intimate personal information.”220 Cell phone tracking can, for 
example, invade the cell phone owner’s “right to privacy in 
one’s home”221 and can reveal “sensitive information about the 
 
 212. Id.  
 213. See id. at 708 (explaining that the information came in the form of 
geographic coordinates that lacked a high degree of certainty). 
 214. See id. (“Despite the lack of precision in the location information, 
Sergeant Perkins and his team were able to ‘tell that . . . one of the 
[complainants’] phones and the [suspect’s] phone were traveling in the same 
general direction . . . as if they were together.’” (citation omitted)).  
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 709. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. at 713. 
 219. Id. at 711 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014)) 
(“Finally, there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell 
phones . . . [n]ow it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all 
that it contains, who is the exception.”).  
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.  
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[owner’s] ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.’”222 
The court walked through two additional considerations. 
First, the court sought to distinguish cell-site simulators from 
other electronic surveillance tools. Unlike the beepers used in 
Knotts and Karo, “a cell-site simulator is a locating, not merely 
a tracking device.”223 Thus, “[w]ith a cell-site 
simulator . . . police no longer need to track a person visually 
from some starting location or physically install a tracking 
device on an object that is, or will come into, his or her 
possession.”224 Second, the court emphasized that because cell 
phones are “dumb devices,” cell phone users are not able to 
insulate themselves from cell-site simulators.225 The only 
countermeasure a cell phone user “can undertake is to turn off 
his or her cellphone or its radios (put it in ‘airplane mode’), 
thus forgoing its use as a communication device.”226 The court 
concluded that, taken together, the information law 
enforcement can obtain by using a cell-site simulator and the 
means by which cell-site simulator surveillance is carried out 
mandates “that under ordinary circumstances, the use of a 
cell-site simulator to locate a person through his or her 
cellphone invades the person’s actual, legitimate, and 
 
 222. Id. at 712. The court is relying on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
in United States v. Jones. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Jones, the government tracked Antoine 
Jones’s movements for four weeks. Id. at 403. Here, the officers used the 
cell-site simulator to track Prince Jones’s movements for only a few hours. 
See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 709 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(describing the arrest of Prince Jones as taking place at 11:30 AM on the 
same day that the officers deployed the cell-site simulator). 
 223. Id. at 713.  
 224. Id. at 712. 
 225. See id. at 713  
[T]he cell-site simulator exploits a security vulnerability in the 
phone—the fact that cellphones are, in the words of the defense 
expert, “dumb devices,” unable to differentiate between a 
legitimate cellular tower and a cell-site simulator masquerading 
as one—and actively induces the phone to divulge its identifying 
information. Once the phone is identified, it can be located.  
(citation omitted).  
 226. Id.  
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her location 
information and is a search.”227 
III. Four Factors Courts Should Consider When Analyzing Law 
Enforcement’s Use of a Cell-Site Simulator 
Taken together, Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) 
indicate that when law enforcement officers use a cell-site 
simulator, they conduct a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. To the extent these cases suggest that law 
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators always amounts to a 
Fourth Amendment search, these holdings are overly-broad 
and rest on “too-generic description[s] of the facts.”228 This 
Note proposes that courts should consider the following factors 
in determining, on a case-by-case basis,229 whether law 
enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a search: 
(1) whether the surveillance infringed on a constitutionally 
protected area, (2) the duration of the surveillance, (3) whether 
the surveillance was active or passive, and (4) the nature of the 
information obtained by the surveillance.230 
 
 227. Id. at 714–15. 
 228. See id. at 728 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that, despite the 
commendable concern about threats to privacy that flow from advances in 
law enforcement technology, the court’s conclusion was based on a 
“too-generic description of the facts surrounding use of the cell-site 
simulator”).  
 229. See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 528 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“The Fourth Amendment is designed to account for an unpredictable 
and limitless range of factual circumstances, and accordingly it generally 
should be applied after those circumstances unfold, not before.” (emphasis 
added)); Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellant, In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 
(5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-20884) (arguing that ex post review of law 
enforcement’s actions is “essential because Fourth Amendment law is 
extremely fact-specific” and courts “cannot apply the Fourth Amendment 
when no facts yet exist”).  
 230. The Kyllo Court emphasized that a thermal imager is a 
sophisticated device that is “not in general public use.” Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Like thermal imagers, cell-site simulators are 
highly sophisticated devices that are not generally available to the public. 
See Brown & Leese, supra note 35, at 12 (describing both the non-disclosure 
agreements imposed by Harris Corporation, the primary manufacturer of 
cell-site simulators, and the hefty purchase price—one cell-site simulator 
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A. Whether the Surveillance Infringed on a Constitutionally 
Protected Area 
The first factor courts should consider when analyzing a 
case involving a cell-site simulator is whether law enforcement 
officers used the cell-site simulator to monitor an individual in 
a constitutionally protected area, such as the home.231 If, by 
using the cell-site simulator, law enforcement officers obtain 
information regarding the interior of an individual’s home, 
then a Fourth Amendment search has taken place.232 In such 
cases, courts need not consider the remaining factors and can 
instead proceed to analyze the reasonableness of the search.233 
Thus, to the extent that the Lambis court relied on an 
individual’s right to “retreat into his own home and there be 
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,”234 it was 
correct in concluding that law enforcement’s warrantless use of 
 
costs around $100,000). Thus, the sophisticated nature of cell-site simulators 
is a constant and does not need to be considered as an independent factor.  
 231. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of 
the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of 
information obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that any 
physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’ 
was too much . . . .” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961))). 
 232. See id. (“In the home, our cases show, all details are 
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (holding that by 
using a beeper to monitor a private residence, law enforcement officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of those individuals with privacy 
interests in the residence). 
 233. See id. at 31 (relying on the foundational notion that, at its very 
core, the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” 
(citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); Brown & 
Leese, supra note 35, at 14 (arguing that if the “searches in Karo and Kyllo 
were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, so too would be the use of a 
cell-site simulator to track a cell phone inside a person’s home”); see also New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (emphasizing that reasonableness 
is the “fundamental command” of the Fourth Amendment). 
 234. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).  
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a cell-site simulator violated Lambis’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy.235 
If, however, the cell-site simulator does not reveal 
information regarding the interior of an individual’s home,236 
then additional analysis is required.237 Recall that under 
Knotts, for example, surveilling an individual in public is not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.238  
 
 235. See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (“The DEA’s use of the cell-site simulator revealed details of the home 
that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion, namely, that the target cell phone was located within Lambis’s 
apartment.” (citation omitted)). The Lambis Court should have limited its 
holding to these facts, but instead held that “[a]bsent a search warrant, the 
Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device.” Id. at 
611.  
 236. Andrews presents an interesting question: did Andrews have the 
same expectations of privacy in an acquaintance’s apartment as he would 
have had in his own home? Put differently, did Andrews have standing to 
bring a Fourth Amendment claim? The Andrews court declined to address 
the standing issue because it had “already determined that Andrews had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his . . . location 
information . . . contained in his cell phone.” Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 
324, 353 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016). In future cell-site simulator questions, 
however, courts should be prepared to analyze whether the target is able to 
establish “that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 
challenged search.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978).  
 237. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483–84 (7th Cir. 
1984) (holding that individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in 
automobiles because automobiles are subject to pervasive and continuing 
governmental regulation); see also LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 11.3(b) 
(discussing reasonable expectations of privacy in residential premises). 
Compare Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990) (holding that one’s 
“status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show . . . an expectation of 
privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”), 
with Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that two visitors 
who came to an apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine, had 
never been to the apartment before, and were only in the apartment for 2.5 
hours lacked standing to challenge an officer’s search of the apartment). 
 238. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (explaining 
that because the officers could have visually surveilled the defendant while 
he was driving in public, the “enhancement of their senses” provided by the 
beeper “raise[d] no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not 
also raise”).  
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B. The Duration of the Surveillance 
The duration of law enforcement’s surveillance was a 
significant factor for the Supreme Court in both United States 
v. Jones and Carpenter v. United States. Accordingly, the 
second factor courts should consider in analyzing a cell-site 
simulator case is the duration of the cell-site simulator 
surveillance. In Jones, law enforcement surveilled Jones’s 
movements for four weeks by installing a GPS tracking device 
on his vehicle.239 Writing in concurrence, Justice Alito 
concluded that the “lengthy monitoring in this case constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.”240 In Carpenter, FBI 
agents obtained 127 days’ worth of Carpenter’s CSLI.241 
Although the Carpenter Court refrained from issuing a bright 
line rule regarding precisely how many days’ worth of CSLI 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search,242 it concluded that 
“accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search.”243 
The cell-site simulator surveillance at issue in Andrews, 
Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) was nowhere near as lengthy as the 
surveillance in Jones or Carpenter. Generally, law enforcement 
officers use cell-site simulators as a last resort in their 
surveillance arsenal, only after they have been tracking a 
target for some time or are already aware of a target’s general 
location. In Andrews, for example, officers obtained Andrews’s 
 
 239. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2001) (“Over the 
next 28 days, the Government used the device to track the vehicle’s 
movements.”).  
 240. Id. at 431.  
 241. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) 
(describing the magistrate judge’s order to MetroPCS, which produced 127 
days’ worth of Carpenter’s cell phone records).  
 242. See id. at 2217 n.3 (declining to decide whether there is a “limited 
period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI 
free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny”); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (“We 
need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this 
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week 
mark.”).  
 243. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3. 
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CSLI for the period from April 5 to May 5, pen register244 data 
for a period of sixty days, and precision GPS data from 
Andrews’s cell phone before ever using the cell-site 
simulator.245 After tracking Andrews’s cell phone’s location to 
“the area of 5000 Clifton Avenue,” the officers deployed the 
cell-site simulator, which was able to pinpoint the cell phone’s 
location as “inside the residence at 5032 Clifton Avenue.”246 
The whole process took no more than a few hours. Cell-site 
simulators were used for similarly brief periods of time in 
Lambis and Jones (D.C.).247 Thus, under Jones and Carpenter, 
the generally brief duration of cell-site simulator surveillance 
should cut against a finding that law enforcement’s use of a 
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search.  
C. Active Versus Passive Surveillance 
Courts should also consider the distinction between active, 
labor-intensive surveillance and passive surveillance when 
analyzing whether law enforcement’s use of a cell-site 
simulator constituted a search.248 The Supreme Court has 
often emphasized the ease with which surveillance can be 
carried out when balancing the government’s interest in 
surveillance against an individual’s expectations of privacy.249 
 
 244. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (“A 
pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a 
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the 
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not 
indicate whether calls are actually completed.”). 
 245. Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 328 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2016).  
 246. Id. at 329.  
 247. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 708 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(describing the officers driving around the area of a specified metro station 
with a cell-site simulator in the back of their vehicle); United States v. 
Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (describing the DEA 
technician walking the halls of Lambis’s apartment building with a cell-site 
simulator).  
 248. The distinction between active and passive surveillance should not 
be confused with the distinction between active and passive cell-site 
simulators. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text (discussing the 
differences between active and passive cell-site simulators).  
 249. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to 
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Whereas prolonged surveillance was difficult, costly, and 
therefore rarely undertaken in the “pre-computer age,” 
technological advances have allowed law enforcement to 
surveil more targets while expending less time and fewer 
resources.250  
As noted by Justice Alito in Jones, without a GPS device, 
surveilling Jones’s vehicle for four weeks would have “required 
a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial 
surveillance.”251 Thus, “[o]nly an investigation of unusual 
importance could have justified such an expenditure of law 
enforcement.”252 By placing a GPS tracking device on Jones’s 
vehicle, however, law enforcement officers were able to 
passively track the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight 
days.253 Passive surveillance was also an issue for the 
Carpenter Court, where Chief Justice Roberts likened GPS 
tracking to law enforcement’s use of CSLI: both are 
inexpensive and “remarkably easy.”254 In Carpenter, FBI 
agents were able to access a comprehensive catalogue of 
Carpenter’s historical location information with “just the click 
of a button.”255 Under both Jones and Carpenter, the Court 
indicated that when technology enables law enforcement to 
surveil a target passively, for extended periods of time, such 
technology is more likely to violate the reasonableness 
mandate of the Fourth Amendment.  
 
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds 
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices.”); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) 
(balancing the gravity of the public interest and the severity of the 
interference with individual liberty in determining the reasonableness of a 
checkpoint stop).  
 250. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 251. Id.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. at 403 (majority opinion) (describing how, in exchange for the 
initial placement of the GPS device and once having to replace the device’s 
battery, the government was able to obtain more than 2,000 pages of location 
data over the four-week period).  
 254. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).  
 255. See id. at 2218 (“With just the click of a button, the Government can 
access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location information at 
practically no expense.”).  
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Using a cell-site simulator is more labor-intensive than 
using a GPS device or obtaining CSLI. Unlike a GPS device, a 
cell-site simulator does not allow law enforcement officers to 
passively surveil a target. In Jones (D.C.), for example, officers 
had to drive around with a cell-site simulator in the back of 
their vehicle before the cell-site simulator could connect with 
Jones’s cell phone.256 Similarly, in Lambis, a trained DEA 
technician had to physically walk the cell-site simulator 
around an apartment complex before he was able to locate 
Lambis’s specific apartment.257  
Thus, law enforcement officers engage in active, rather 
than passive surveillance when they use cell-site simulators. 
Surveillance conducted using a cell-site simulator should not 
run afoul of the Fourth Amendment simply because cell-site 
simulators allow law enforcement officers to do their jobs more 
efficiently.258 When law enforcement officers are engaged in 
active, hands-on surveillance, they are less likely to surveil a 
target for a prolonged period of time. This factor should also 
generally cut against a finding that law enforcement’s use of a 
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search.  
D. The Nature of the Information Obtained by the Surveillance 
The fourth factor courts should consider when analyzing a 
cell-site simulator case is the nature of the information 
obtained by the cell-site simulator. If, as in Andrews, Lambis, 
and Jones (D.C.), the information is limited to the target cell 
phone’s “pings,” then this factor should cut against a finding 
 
 256. See Jones, 168 A.3d at 708 (describing the officers driving around 
the area of a specified metro station with a cell-site simulator in the back of 
their vehicle).  
 257. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 609 (describing the DEA technician 
walking the halls of Lambis’s apartment building with a cell-site simulator).  
 258. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“We have 
never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do 
so now.”); Richard H. McAdams, Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper 
Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 314 
(1985) (“Individuals understand that police sometimes engage in extended 
visual surveillance. Our society has accepted the ancient surveillance 
technique of physical shadowing since the founding of our government.”).  
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that the use of the cell-site simulator constituted a search.259 
When used in this way, cell-site simulators are similar to the 
beeper devices in Knotts and Karo.260 Under Knotts and Karo, 
the use of cell-site simulators does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search unless the pings reveal information 
regarding the interior of an individual’s own home.261 
The location information generated by the cell-site 
simulators in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) is 
distinguishable from the CSLI at issue in Carpenter. In 
Carpenter, the prosecution used Carpenter’s CSLI to generate 
maps placing Carpenter’s phone near the locations of four 
separate robberies at the date and time each robbery took 
place.262 Unlike CSLI, cell-site simulators cannot be used to 
generate extensive records chronicling a target user’s past 
movements.263 Whereas CSLI is collected and stored by 
wireless carriers for years, a cell-site simulator only tracks a 
cell phone’s location in real-time and does not store this 
information.264 The historical nature of CSLI was essential to 
the Carpenter Court’s holding: “We do not express a view on 
matters not before us . . . real-time CSLI or ‘tower-dumps’ (a 
download of information on all the devices that connected to a 
particular cell site during a particular interval).”265 
 
 259. See, e.g., United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The [cell-site simulator] then calculates the strength of the 
‘pings’ until the target phone is pinpointed.”).  
 260. See McAdams, supra note 258, at 313–14 (explaining that beepers 
function like radio transmitters and therefore require “continued observation 
to discover someone’s identity, route, and final destination”).  
 261. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the interplay between the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Knotts and Karo).  
 262. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (“In the Government’s view, the 
location records clinched the case: They confirmed that Carpenter was right 
where the . . . robbery was at the exact time of the robbery.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 263. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 37, at 17 (illustrating the following 
uses for cell-site simulators: (1) identifying unknown phones currently used 
by the target, (2) locating devices, and (3) selectively blocking devices). 
 264. See id. at 24–25 (pointing out that a warrant is not needed for law 
enforcement’s use of digital analyzers and cell-site simulators when they are 
employed to intercept non-content data, such as real-time location 
information). 
 265. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).  
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Law enforcement’s uses of cell-site simulators in Andrews, 
Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) were similarly distinguishable from 
accessing the contents of a cell phone, which the Supreme 
Court has held constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.266 If, 
as has been suggested by the EFF, law enforcement were to 
use a cell-site simulator to log cell phones’ metadata and 
content,267 then under Riley v. California,268 the use of the 
cell-site simulator would constitute a search.269 In Riley, the 
Court considered whether law enforcement may, as part of a 
search incident to lawful arrest,270 search the digital 
information stored on an arrestee’s cell phone without a 
warrant.271 The Court held that law enforcement must 
generally obtain a search warrant before searching a cell 
phone and accessing its digitally stored information.272  
Contrary to the holdings in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones 
(D.C.), using a cell-site simulator does not categorically 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Courts should analyze 
each of the four factors discussed above to determine whether, 
by using a cell-site simulator, law enforcement officers engaged 
in a Fourth Amendment search.  
 
 266. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that 
officers must secure a warrant before conducting a search of data on cell 
phones).  
 267. See Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 35 (“Some 
cell-site simulators may have advanced features allowing law enforcement to 
intercept communications or even alter the content of communications.”).  
 268. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 269. See id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do 
before searching [the contents of] a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).  
 270. See id. at 391 (“The search incident to arrest exception rests not only 
on the heightened government interests at stake in a volatile arrest 
situation, but also on an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being 
taken into police custody.”).  
 271. See id. at 378 (considering the “common question” of “whether the 
police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone 
seized from an individual who has been arrested”).  
 272. See id. at 386 (declining to extend the search incident to a lawful 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement to the digital information stored 
on cell phones).  
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IV. A Search Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment Unless It 
Is Unreasonable 
Assuming, after consideration of the four factors discussed 
in Part III, a court concludes that law enforcement’s use of a 
cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search, 
the court must next determine whether the search was 
reasonable. The reasonableness requirement is the ultimate 
touchstone and “fundamental command” of the Fourth 
Amendment.273 In drafting the Fourth Amendment, the 
Framers recognized that searches and seizures were “too 
valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them entirely,” but 
that “they should be slowed down.”274 In determining the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure, courts measure both the 
permissibility of the initial decision to search or seize and the 
permissible scope of those intrusions.275  
A. Four Models for Determining Reasonableness 
Despite the importance of reasonableness to the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has failed to settle on a single 
reasonableness standard. Professor Thomas Clancy suggests 
that historically, the Supreme Court has used four models to 
determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure: (1) the 
warrant preference model, (2) the individualized suspicion 
model, (3) the balancing model, and (4) the common law plus 
balancing model.276 
 
 273. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).  
 274. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)  
Obviously, those who wrote this Fourth Amendment knew from 
experience that searches and seizures were too valuable to law 
enforcement to prohibit them entirely, but also knew at the same 
time that while searches or seizures must not be stopped, 
they should be slowed down, and warrants should be issued only 
after studied caution. 
 275. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (determining that the 
reasonableness of a search requires a twofold inquiry: first, consider 
“whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,” and second, determine 
whether the search as conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place”).  
 276. CLANCY, supra note 87, at 682–85.  
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Under the warrant preference model, “a search or seizure 
is not unreasonable, and therefore not forbidden, when it is 
carried out with a warrant issued pursuant to the criteria set 
out in the Warrant Clause.”277 Under the individualized 
suspicion model, for a search or seizure to be reasonable, law 
enforcement must have either probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, but not necessarily a warrant, prior to executing the 
search or seizure.278 Under the balancing model, the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure hinges on the balancing 
of governmental interests against individual interests.279 
Under the common law plus balancing model, courts first ask 
“whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or 
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was 
framed.”280 Should that inquiry “yield no answer,” courts next 
“evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of 
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”281  
 
 277. Id. at 682. Justice Frankfurter, a staunch advocate for the warrant 
preference model, argued that “[o]ne cannot wrench ‘unreasonable searches’ 
from the text, context, and historic content of the Fourth Amendment.” 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 278. See id. at 685 (discussing the individualized suspicion model); see 
also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925) (creating the 
“automobile exception” and holding that a warrant is not always required, 
and thus is not the sine qua non of reasonableness). 
 279. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) 
(balancing “the need to search against the invasion which the search 
entail[ed]”); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306 (1999) (noting 
that the “practical realities” associated with balancing competing 
governmental and individual interests “militate in favor of the needs of law 
enforcement, and against a personal-privacy interest that is ordinarily 
weak”). 
 280. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299.  
 281. Id. at 300. 
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B. The Warrant Preference Model Is Best-Suited to Analyzing 
the Reasonableness of Cell-Site Simulators 
Of the four models, the warrant preference model is 
best-suited to cases involving cell-site simulators. Under the 
warrant preference model, a search or seizure is unreasonable, 
and therefore unconstitutional, when carried out without a 
warrant issued pursuant to the criteria set out in the Warrant 
Clause.282 Although courts no longer categorically apply the 
warrant preference model, the Supreme Court continues to use 
this model as a means of determining the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure, particularly in cases in the criminal law 
enforcement context.283 
Generally, law enforcement officers use cell-site 
simulators in the “enterprise of ferreting out crime.”284 Law 
enforcement’s objectives in using cell-site simulators are penal, 
rather than regulatory.285 As such, the two reasonableness 
 
 282. See CLANCY, supra note 87, at 682 (discussing the origins of the 
warrant preference model); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”). 
 283. See id. at 684 (“The warrant preference model remains one of the 
methods the Court uses to measure reasonableness”); see also, e.g., Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Searches conducted 
without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts 
unquestionably showing probable cause’ . . . .”); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963) (discussing the need for the “deliberate 
impartial judgment of a judicial officer” to be “interposed between the citizen 
and the police”).  
 284. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (explaining 
that a “neutral and detached magistrate,” rather than an officer engaged in 
the “enterprise of ferreting out crime,” should be the one to determine 
“[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search”).  
 285. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: 
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 408 (1988) 
(arguing that terms such as “administrative search” or “inspection” do not 
effectively limit the Supreme Court’s holding in Camara to administrative 
search cases); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294–95 
(1984) (distinguishing between administrative and conventional search 
warrants based on whether the objective of the search is criminal 
evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504–05 (1978) (discussing 
whether the government’s intent in conducting a search was administrative 
or criminal).  
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balancing models, which have been relegated to the 
administrative search or “community-caretaking” context, are 
inapplicable to law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators.286  
Should courts begin regularly applying the warrant 
preference model to cases involving cell-site simulators, law 
enforcement can “more easily predict whether their actions 
will be considered constitutional.”287 Additionally, cell-site 
simulators are often used in conjunction with other 
surveillance technology, such as CSLI, which require law 
enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant.288 Thus, a 
request to use a cell-site simulator can and should be included 
in law enforcement’s application for a search warrant. As with 
other surveillance technology, when law enforcement officers 
procure a search warrant, “there is little question that the 
subsequent search will be deemed valid.”289 A general rule that 
a search warrant is required, qualified by necessary 
exceptions, will provide law enforcement officers with 
much-needed clarity.290 
 
 286. See Michael R. Diminio, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community 
Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1487 (2009) (explaining that, when a search or 
seizure is undertaken for purposes other than law enforcement, the 
“ordinary presumption that warrantless searches are unreasonable ceases to 
apply”). 
 287. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1139 (2012) 
(“Police officers can more easily predict whether their actions will be 
considered constitutional under the warrant preference view than under an 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that just tells them they need to act 
‘reasonably.’”).  
 288. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) 
(holding that law enforcement officers must obtain a search warrant 
supported by probable cause prior to accessing historic cell-site location 
information); see also United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (writing that DEA agents had sought a warrant for pen 
register information and CSLI for Lambis’s cell phone before using the 
cell-site simulator).  
 289. Lee, supra note 287, at 1139.  
 290. See id. (describing the Supreme Court’s reliance on providing law 
enforcement officers with clear guidance); see also, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (stressing the importance of clear rules for 
inventories of arrestees); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458–60 
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V. Conclusion 
Electronic surveillance technology has undoubtedly come a 
long way since the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States 
v. Knotts and United States v. Karo.291 The cell-site simulators 
at issue in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) are far more 
sophisticated than the beepers in Knotts and Karo, or even the 
thermal imager in Kyllo v. United States.292 The Supreme 
Court’s more recent decisions in Carpenter v. United States 
and Riley v. California seem to indicate that cell phones and 
the location information they generate are entitled to special 
consideration under the Fourth Amendment.293 Thus, it is 
tempting to conclude that cell-site simulators, by virtue of 
their sophistication, efficiency, and interaction with cell 
phones, categorically violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
mandate that “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”294 The courts in 
Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) adopted this rationale. 
Taken together, their holdings indicate that any time law 
enforcement officers use a cell-site simulator, they conduct a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.295  
The courts in Andrews, Lambis, and Jones (D.C.) were 
clearly concerned about the threats to privacy that coincide 
with advances in surveillance technology.296 While this concern 
 
(1981) (emphasizing the need for “bright lines” regarding permissible scope 
of searches incident to lawful arrests). 
 291. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the beeper devices used in Knotts 
and Karo).  
 292. See supra Part I.B (explaining how cell-site simulators work).  
 293. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (holding that “an individual 
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical 
movements as captured through CSLI”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 
393 (2014) (recognizing that in light of the “immense storage capacity” of 
modern cell phones, police officers must generally obtain a warrant before 
searching the contents of a cell phone).  
 294. U.S. CONST. amend IV.  
 295. See supra Part III (critiquing the holdings in Andrews, Lambis, and 
Jones (D.C.)).  
 296. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (commending the Court’s concern “about the threats to privacy 
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is commendable, in ruling on cell-site simulator cases, courts 
cannot “rest[] on a too-generic description of the facts” 
surrounding the use of the cell-site simulator.297 As with any 
issue that implicates the Fourth Amendment, it is important 
to be clear about what actually occurred.298 Instead of adhering 
to the categorical rationales utilized in Andrews, Lambis, and 
Jones (D.C.), courts should analyze the four factors discussed 
in Part III to determine, on a case-by-case basis,299 whether 
law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a 
search.300 If a court concludes that the use of a cell-site 
simulator constituted a search, then that search should be 
considered unreasonable, and in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, if it was conducted without a search warrant.301 
Broader, more comprehensive regulations regarding the use of 
cell-site simulators are better left to Congress and state and 
local legislatures.302  
 
that may flow from advances in the technology available to the law 
enforcement profession”). 
 297. See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 728 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) 
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that, despite the commendable concern 
about threats to privacy that flow from advances in law enforcement 
technology, the court’s conclusion was based on a “too-generic description of 
the facts surrounding use of the cell-site simulator”).  
 298. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (emphasizing 
that “[i]t is important to be clear about what occurred in this case”).  
 299. See Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellant, In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 
(5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-20884) (arguing that ex post review of law 
enforcement’s actions is “essential because Fourth Amendment law is 
extremely fact-specific” and courts “cannot apply the Fourth Amendment 
when no facts yet exist”).  
 300. See supra Part III (discussing the four factors: (1) whether the 
surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected area, (2) the duration of 
the surveillance, (3) whether the surveillance was active or passive, and (4) 
the nature of the information obtained by the surveillance). 
 301. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that the warrant preference model of 
determining reasonableness should be applied to cases involving law 
enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators).  
 302. See, e.g., DeGeer, supra note 23, at 352 (arguing that Congress 
should draft a bill “enumerating when, how, and by whom a cell-site 
simulator may be used”). 
